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Space monkey, sign of the time, time
Space monkey, so outta line, line
Space monkey, sort of divine
And he’s mine, mine, all mine.
(Patty Smith)
It’s coming to America first,
the cradle of the best and of the worst.
It’s here they got the range
and the machinery for change
and it’s here they got the spiritual thirst.
It’s here the family’s broken
and it’s here the lonely say
that the heart has got to open
in a fundamental way:
Democracy is coming to the U.S.A.
(Leonard Cohen)
Introduction
While the conscience and sense of America’s vulnerability, with its
global implications, has exploded in all its enormity after the 9/11 attacks,
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the redeployment of American security policies, parallel to the reorgani-
zation of international security, had been going on since at least the late
1980s, assuming more recognizable forms in the 1990s due to the most
general sense of a “new world order” following the end of the Cold War.
International discourse on security has been inevitably transformed as
America has reinvented itself in the global context in different historical
moments1. In this essay I shall attempt to demonstrate that Chuck Pa-
lahniuk’s cult novel Fight Club (1996) comments on global discourses on
vulnerability and security, their variable scale, and how the variability of
this scale illuminates spaces that are liminal to the political sphere – iron-
ically questioning the very boundaries of what is political.
Through the concept of scale, I especially refer to how the discourse
of threat and emancipation from threat is played across individual and
communal levels. In Fight Club, discourses articulating vulnerability – its
disempowering consequences, protective reactions against it, and also its
empowering aspects – are produced in the subject by means of direct
address; correspondingly, they are also claimed, disseminated, and appro-
priated across various communities and various layers of the public
sphere. In my view, Fight Club comments on a shared sense of vulnera-
bility historically emerging next to a crisis of responsibility. On the one
hand, this crisis of responsibility can be interpreted as sliding towards
dystopian nihilism and as a destruction of any possibility for creating a
viable community. On the other hand, I maintain that the novel precisely
comments on the construction of a community-in-insecurity: more specif-
ically, on the unbalance and clash between different degrees of subjective
responsibility in creating, preserving, and/or destroying a collectivity.
In what follows, firstly, I consider Fight Club’s construction of a fic-
tional world predicated on a generalized sense of shared vulnerability, and
explore how this sense results into a problematic re-appropriation of vio-
lence and the creation of a liminal community that challenges the main-
stream. Fight Club’s liminal community is a system that works alterna-
tively interrogating and distancing, humanizing and de-humanizing, iden-
tifying and un-identifying its members; the inclusiveness of this system is
based on the capacity to relinquish empathy the way the mainstream
knows it, and maybe create liminal (underground, or one might say
“cult”?) forms of empathy.
Secondly, I move on to explore the “sociology of knowledge” behind
the construction of Fight Club’s oppositional community, reflected in the
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novel’s narrative strategies and structure, and speculate on degrees of
responsibility corresponding to various degrees of embeddedness and
awareness on the part of the members of this collectivity. Both fight club
as a community and the globalizedAmerican community that is challenged
by the club’s operations are predicated on a combination of emancipatory
rhetoric (being free, exercising one’s power) and strictly hierarchical struc-
tures of awareness and access to knowledge (you are only allowed to know,
and do, that much). In both fight club as oppositional community and the
broader community around it, I argue, threat and emancipation from threat
are privatized, made into commodities, and expropriated in a grim, totali-
tarian public sphere. At the same time, by constructing fight club as a lim-
inal community, the novel offers a possibility to break this cycle of appro-
priation, turning a scenario of vulnerability into a reflection on the political
constituencies that endorse protection for certain subjects and exclude
other subjects from the same protection.
Subjects and Contexts of In/Security
To the very bones, the plot and structure of Fight Club are as follows:
A nameless narrator – a young man, apparently in his thirties – has a
white-collar job in a big car company, and lives in a well-kept and stylish
condo; despite his apparently well-rounded and successful life, he suffers
from chronic insomnia and suffocates under a social imperative that
makes him, and thousands like him, links in a compulsive chain of pro-
duction and consumption: “[g]enerations have been working in jobs they
hate, just so they can buy what they don’t really need” (Palahniuk, Fight
Club 149)2. In order to find some degree of relief from his existential pain,
the narrator begins to attend support groups for people with terminal dis-
eases, and thereby meets Marla Singer, a bizarre outcast who entertains a
similar relationship with reality and for whom he gradually develops a
more-or-less covered sexual interest. After his condo is mysteriously
blown up, he moves in with Tyler Durden, an obscure guy who lives in a
semi-abandoned house and works as a part-time projectionist, waiter, and
soap producer. Almost by chance, one night the narrator and Tyler initiate
“fight club” – namely, a gathering of men who physically confront each
other, two at a time, the fights going on for “as long as they have to” (50).
Fight club is empowering to its members: “[a]fter a night in fight club,
everything in the real world gets the volume turned down. Nothing can
piss you off” (49). Fight club grows prodigiously in the whole country and
evolves into Project Mayhem (sic), a guerrilla terrorist organization man-
aged by Tyler that sets out to trouble the corporate world that has created
alienation for the so-called functional members of society and has attacked
and undermined the masculinity of its men. In the second part of the novel,
thanks to Marla, the narrator realizes that Tyler is a product of his own
twisted mind. Tyler is revealed to be the narrator’s alter ego, taking over
his body when he falls asleep. Not buying into the extremist development
of Tyler’s agenda, the narrator attempts to undo Project Mayhem and pro-
tect Marla, whom he believes to be in danger. In a final confrontation on
top of the “Parker-Morris Building”, the narrator and his alter ego confront
each other and, in order to stop “Tyler”, the narrator shoots himself. The
enigmatic epilogue suggests that he has not died and has instead become
a patient in a mental institution. In his post-trauma, he believes he is in
heaven and wants to go back to the world of the living – who, in turn, want
“Tyler” back.
The novel is told by the nameless narrator and interspersed, as we
shall see, with other voices. Referring to the style employed, Palahniuk
himself describes it as follows: “jump[ing] … from scene to scene … a
mosaic of different moments and details. Giving them all a continuity and
yet showcasing each moment by not ramming it up against the next
moment” (Palahniuk, Afterword 213).
A sense of mounting chaos and vulnerability, which involves living
under a number of impending threats, the forms assumed by these threats,
and the responses to them constitute in many ways the cultural horizon of
the novel, and are among the novel’s main thematic concerns. Diffused
vulnerability spans from individual to global concerns – from the body, ill-
ness, masculine integrity, to the nation, the environment, the earth itself.
This obviously responds to a broad, typically postmodern global loss of
references, and a growing sense of fragmentation and alienation accom-
panying the end of the “grand narratives” or “metanarratives” that charac-
terized modernity3. The novel opens with what would subsequently
become a paradigmatically apocalyptic scene: the tower of the “Parker-
Morris building” is about to collapse, bombed in its foundations, and the
nameless narrator is facing Tyler, his mentor in rebellion, who holds a gun
in the narrator’s mouth. Awaiting the explosion, the two are locked in a
cinematic confrontation, about to sacrifice themselves and enter “eternal
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life” (11)4. In the shadow of the impending apocalypse, and in the “three
minutes” (15) leading to it, the nameless narrator “remember[s] every-
thing” (ibid.) and the story begins to unfold in retrospective.
This apocalyptic scenario is the one that most obviously resonates
with a posteriori implications of 9/11. It has been repeatedly noted that, in
the ineludible shadow of an event so charged with emotional bearing as
the attacks of 9/11, practically all texts presenting scenarios of terror,
including Fight Club, become charged with a power of prescience (Peter-
sen). If, on the other hand, we make an effort to restrict our frame of ref-
erence to the 1990s, and to the self-perception and perception of the U.S.
in the global context during the pre-9/11 decade, a text such as Palahniuk’s
still resonates with a profound cultural shift - also reflected in other texts,
such as Don De Lillo’s Mao II and Underworld: “the shift from secure
paranoia of the Cold War to the insecure paranoia of a postnational age in
which everything is connected” (Knight 193-94).
After this apocalyptic intro, chapter two portrays incoming death,
and an overall realization of vulnerability, as suspended between empath-
ic identification and distance. The narrator’s alienation from the trap of his
white-collar job and from his life as a consumer of commodities – a life
that is frightfully perfect, and because of that curbing and ultimately cas-
trating – manifests itself in the form of insomnia: “[e]verything is so far
away, a copy of a copy of a copy. The insomnia distance of everything,
you can’t touch anything and nothing can touch you” (21). Chapter two
follows the narrator attending various support groups for people with ter-
minal diseases. Attendance of these groups appears to him as the only way
to empathize with fellow-humans: “it’s easy to cry when you realize that
everyone you love will reject you or die” (17). “ ‘It will be alright,’ Bob
says. ‘You cry now.’ ” (16). The narrator’s rediscovered sense of vulnera-
bility is what offers him an escape from the isolation and unreality that
characterize his life: “after a support group, I felt more alive than I’d ever
felt” (22). This also applies to Marla: “[Marla] never dreamed she could
feel so marvelous. She actually felt alive. […] All her life, she never saw
a dead person. There was no real sense of life because she had nothing to
contrast it with” (38). Neither the narrator nor Marla, whom he immedi-
ately recognizes as a fellow-faker, would, strictly speaking, be entitled to
enter this community of the terminally diseased. Nonetheless, they seek
solace from attending the groups and feel entitled to belong to a commu-
nity racing towards death because they belong to the same chain of alien-
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ating consumption, albeit in different positions. The narrator’s stance is
actually extremely ambiguous, suspended as it is between empathic iden-
tification and distancing due to the fact that he is not, strictly speaking, ill
(and neither is Marla). According to Alex E. Blazer, the narrator is a
fetishist in his approach to the people in the support groups, just like he is
a fetishist in his relation to the consumer goods against which he has for a
long time defined himself: “he is still invested in his life of deadly goods
despite its pathological ramifications. When stuff no longer fills him up,
dying people do” (Blazer 185). On the other hand, the narrator discrimi-
nates among the ghastly presences around him. While everybody speeds,
inevitably, towards death, not everyone does it in the same way: “Okay in
that brainy brain-food philosophy way, we’re all dying, but Marla isn’t
dying the way Chloe was dying” (37). The novel apparently suggests that
the chain of alienating consumption is both shared and not the same for
everyone. In other words, despite generalized vulnerability, different
forms and levels of vulnerability, insecurity, and pain exist.
While illness threatens survival in its barest form, the novel also
describes threats that are both more culturally specific and more collec-
tive. After the nameless narrator has “met” his alter ego Tyler and they
have initiated fight club, the forces that threaten human survival are
played out at increasingly communal levels: “[f]or thousands of years,
human beings had screwed up and trashed and crapped on this planet, and
now history expected me to clean up after everyone” (104). “Recycling
and speed-limits are bullshit. They’re like someone who quits smoking on
his deathbed” (125).
With its gruesome evocation of waste, dumpsters, toxicity, and envi-
ronmental defilement, the novel heavily plays on global dimensions of inse-
curity and vulnerability. Ironically reversed, those threats turn into empow-
erment strategies and weapons in the hands of Tyler and his followers.
Bacteria and illness, an almost inevitable byproduct of the healthcare sys-
tem, are appropriated by those who can use them: “I asked the doctor where
could we get our hands on some of these hepatitis bugs, and he’s drunk
enough to laugh. […] Everything goes to the medical waste dump, he says”
(85). Becoming aware of the fundamental vulnerability of each individual
becomes the indispensable starting point of Tyler’s project: “[s]omeday you
will die and, until you know that, you’re useless to me” (76).
Economic insecurity and a job market that is unable to provide for
the opportunities that are an essential component of the American Dream
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form another good portion of the novel’s backdrop: “[d]on’t think of this
as rejection. Think of this as downsizing” (113). Economic insecurity also
threatens human survival in its barest forms – for instance, through denial
of care for those who do not have access to the corporate health system.
Marla does not have a health insurance, and ends up in
a clinic where slumped scarecrow mothers sat in plastic chairs […] The children
were sunken and dark around their eyes […] and the mother scratched at mats of
dandruff from scalp yeast infections out of control (108).
The novel darkly prophesies that social inequality might return with
a vengeance and terrorize a corporate world that depends on it without
acknowledging so:
The people you try to step on, we’re everyone you depend on. We’re the people
who do your laundry and cook your food and serve you dinner. We make your bed.
We guard you while you’re asleep. We drive the ambulances. We direct your call.
[…] We process your insurance claims and credit card charges. We control every
part of your life.
We are the middle children of history. […] And we’re just learning this fact [… ].
So don’t fuck with us” (166).
What do issues as various as the ones just mentioned have to do with
an umbrella-concept as broad as “security” – and how does this concept
contribute to contextualize Fight Club in the episteme of the 1990s? From
the 1990s onwards5 the purview of security – that is, the individuation of
threats, their management, and the development of a discourse aimed at
their removal – has expanded, both in the U.S. and globally. For instance,
as noted by Peter Andreas and Richard Price, increasingly after the end of
the Cold War, the American national security apparatus has been massive-
ly redeployed and used in handling issues that are both more limited and
broader than State-level ones: from the late 1980s on there has been “an
outward expansion of the portfolio of national security from previous
internal policing domains, and the deployment of the external military
apparatus for ‘operations other than war’, involving a variety of interna-
tional policing missions” (Andreas and Price 31). Security and protection
as perceived imperatives and diffused discourses, and the very idea of
security, have massively moved away from being exclusively centered on
intrastate conflicts and on the State as the ultimate subject and the privi-
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leged organizational structure enforcing security. If the State was previ-
ously envisioned as the principal guarantor of its citizens’ safety, entitled
to protect them from external threats, scholars have subsequently chal-
lenged this view. It has been argued that the State simply cannot be the
ultimate frame of reference for policies that have much broader implica-
tions and for threats that have a global impact. Moreover, as presently
remarked, a number of threats are increasingly listed under security con-
cerns that call for a joint action and collaboration among states and vari-
ous other political entities. Among these concerns are environmental risks,
unequal development and consequent economic insecurity, the manage-
ment of health threats, and domestic and international terrorism. This is a
scenario that intertwines with what Emma Rothschild has called “hori-
zontally” and “vertically” extended conceptions of security. In a vertical-
ly-extended conception of security, security as an ideal condition is seen
as the very root of human emancipation, and is a matter that is relevant to
the human global community and the individual. In a horizontally-extend-
ed conception of security, protection, a traditionally military concern, is
extended to the “civilian” fields of the political, social, and environmen-
tal6. In this context of extension, the U.S play a pivotal role as the hege-
monic force on the international stage after the end of the Cold War.
Within this context, I find especially meaningful that a novel such as Fight
Club reflects many of the concerns of post-Cold War discourses on secu-
rity: from poverty and social unrest to environmental issues, from health
to travel safety to terrorism.
The aforementioned extension implies, I would suggest, that the
predicament of security, especially as it has been discussed from the 1990s
on, cuts across several levels of subjectivization: protection is exercised
by various collective subjects, and it is both the condition and the conse-
quence of the emancipation of private individuals. Moreover, especially
from the 1990s on, parallel to its enlargement, security has been an
increasingly contested concept, and this inevitably interrogates both the
constituency of the political and the nature of subjectivity. The very idea
of a “subject of security” is fraught with contradictions. The 1990s are
increasingly the decade when there is growing, global agreement that
security is important, but what is the subject itself of security is contested.
As noted by R. B. J. Walker, the “difficulties of analyzing the meaning of
security […] [largely] derive from […] its derivation from a prior account
of who or what is to be secured” (Walker 68, my emphasis). Not all sub-
jects are entitled to political status in the same way: consequently, not all
subjects are comprised in the terms in which we reflect on security.
Scholars in Critical Security Studies have argued that the main concern of
any reflection on security, insecurity, and threat should be a politically sit-
uated interrogation of which subjects are protected and for what reasons,
because neither all individuals nor all communities are immediately sub-
sumed under the umbrella of the political7.
It is my contention that Palahniuk’s Fight Club might also be read as
a novel that comments on a generalized, yet simultaneously diversified
vulnerability, and on the crisis of reference as to who is entitled to securi-
ty, and which entities are responsible for safeguarding security, precisely
through problematically linking two levels – the communal and the indi-
vidual. While Fight Clubmirrors coeval security concerns – from the indi-
vidual to the global – at a thematic level, it also reproduces an interroga-
tion of subjectivity (its extension and its limits) with relation to a political
constituency. This interrogation is one of the key features of a critical
reflection on vulnerability and in/security8. What is secured, and under
what conditions?Why should it be?What implications does this bear? The
aforementioned reflections urge me to interrogate community and its con-
struction in the novel, and how this construction bears, in turn, on dis-
courses on vulnerability and in/security – and to what extent, correspond-
ingly, vulnerability and in/security become, in Fight Club, keywords for
reflecting politically on the construction of a collectivity and the role of
the individual in it: “[m]odern accounts of security are precisely about
subjectivity, subjection, and the conditions under which we have been
constructed as subjects subjected to subjection. They tell us who we must
be” (Walker 71).
De-Individualization, Community, Public and Private Violence
Fight club is, in many ways, a novel about the very construction of a
community, and, correspondingly, a reflection on collectivity. Scholars
have repeatedly focused their attention on the misogynist, hyper-mascu-
line character of this collectivity, in some cases intertwining this reflection
with one on its anti-democratic, fundamentally totalitarian character. Fight
club as community and its later development, Project Mayhem, have espe-
cially been discussed by scholars and critics who have written on
Fincher’s filmic version, reading it next to other films – especially from
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the Reagan years – celebrating the tradition of the violent hero, advocate
of self-made justice, “reclaiming American pride and masculine prowess”
(Barker 173)9. Fight Club members, all men, mostly but not exclusively
white, gather around Tyler Durden, and the rhetorical structure of this
gathering is provided by the rules that are repeated like a mantra at the
opening of each fight club meeting. Palahniuk writes that, culturally
speaking, the novel filled a gap, providing, at a time when the book mar-
ket was mostly occupied by works offering new models of social bonding
and solidarity for women, “a new social model for men to share their
lives” (Palahniuk, Afterword 214).
In their variety and diversity, critical responses to Fight Club – to
Palahniuk’s novel, but also and especially to David Fincher’s cinematic
rendition, that has in turn made the novel and Palahniuk himself into pop
cult icons – bespeak, one might argue, both its liberating and its oppres-
sive potential. They also bespeak the difficulty, and the urge, to pinpoint
Tyler’s political stance. Is Tyler a revolutionary? An anarchist? A fascist?
Is he a liberator of the oppressed, or is he an oppressor? Where is he to be
located in the political spectrum? Generally speaking, readings can be
divided between those who see Fight Club (both the novel and the film)
as the expression of a totalitarian, repressive, and fundamentally regres-
sive political view and those who see it as liberating and iconoclastic –
albeit not necessarily politically progressive or constructive. In Peter
Mathews’s words, the “bulk of the criticism has […] centered on whether
Tyler Durden is a positive or negative role model, particularly in the light
of the political statements that issue from his mouth” (Mathews 82). The
aforementioned simultaneous difficulty and urge to locate Tyler’s stance
politically10 also bespeaks the necessity to discriminate, as Judith Butler
would say, between identifications that grant authority and identifications
that hinder being heard in the public sphere. To many, Tyler’s voice may
be a seductive but ultimately “uninhabitable identification” (Butler xix),
embodying a self-destructive style that cannot result into any articulable
political project shared by a collectivity. In this sense, the end of the novel
is in itself ambiguous. Tyler disappears from the world when the nameless
narrator’s extreme solution “kills” him, but, in a messianic expectation,
his people wait for his return. When the narrator finds himself in what
looks like a psychiatric hospital after shooting himself in his attempt to kill
his alter ego, he is surrounded by signs that the cult of fight club is not
over – only postponed:
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Because every once in a while, somebody brings me my lunch tray and my meds
and he has a black eye or his forehead is swollen with stitches, and he says:
“We miss you Mr. Durden”.
Or somebody with a broken nose pushes a mop past me and whispers:
“Everything’s going according to the plan.” […]
“We look forward to getting you back.” (208)
The creation of a community in Fight Club is accompanied by
extreme experiences that border on de-individualization, on collectiviza-
tion as an obliteration of self – a move that can be easily seen as pro-
foundly totalitarian, especially in the context of American culture – one
that notoriously values individualism. In the terms of one of Tyler’s fol-
lowers – members of “Project Mayhem”, called by the narrator “space
monkeys”:
“You are not a beautiful and unique snowflake. You are the same decaying organ-
ic matter as everyone else, and we are all part of the same compost pile.”
The space monkey continues, “Our culture has made us all the same. No one is
truly white or black or rich, anymore. We all want the same. Individually, we are
nothing.” (134)
Lynn M. Ta and Jennifer Barker discuss Fincher’s film version of
Fight Club, pointing out the repressive quality of a project that is only
empowering to Tyler, fight club fighters, and members of Project
Mayhem: in the end, Ta argues, they replicate the same oppressive struc-
ture that they discern and criticize in corporate capitalism. According to
Jennifer Barker, Fight Club portrays “a system based on repression”
(Barker 180). After the narrator has realized that he is Tyler, he attempts
to invest Tyler’s authority for canceling both fight club and Project
Mayhem, but he is confronted by a compact group of man and a voice
reading out the legendary rules, and he is mercilessly evicted from the
venue where the men have gathered. His attempt at re-enacting control
and authority clashes with anonymity: “I’m not leaving. I’m not giving up.
[…] I’m in control here. […] Evict fight club member, now!” (180). One
member comes to the point of believing that Tyler has made himself into
“homework” – an exemplification of how the project works. Despite the
iconic, legendary status of Tyler as the founder of fight club, Tyler’s rules
are increasingly depersonalized as the project develops, and the founder
seriously risks becoming – according to a collectivized mechanism of ret-
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ribution echoing Maximilien de Robespierre’s fate in the French
Revolution11 – the illustrious victim of the system he has set in motion.
The iron discipline he encounters in the murderous Project Mayhem mem-
bers is, allegedly, not specifically addressed to him – it is the ecumenical
grip directed at any anonymous infringer of the law: “[n]othing personal,
Mr Durden” (188). The torture he is subjected to is the terror of physical
emasculation, the threat of having his testicles cut off (187-91), replicat-
ing the occasion when Tyler had orchestrated this very torture for another
illustrious victim, the Seattle Police Commissioner (164-66).
Critical reactions to Fight Club, just like to a number of other con-
troversial texts of the late 1980s and early-mid 1990s12, partly indict it
(both the novel and Fincher’s film) as an encouragement to gratuitous vio-
lence13. Mark Seltzer has discussed America’s “wound culture” as one in
which “death is the theater for the living” (Seltzer 22) – one in which, in
other words, it is the public sphere itself that is seen as pathological: “the
very idea of ‘the public’ has become inseparable from spectacles of bodi-
ly and mass violence” (Seltzer 21). Fight Club intensely draws on this
logic. Among Tyler’s objectives is to aestheticize violence, make it icon-
ic: “[t]his isn’t really death […] We’ll be a legend” (11); “[a] real opera of
a death” (203).
Per Serritslev Petersen reads Fight Club (next to Bret Easton Ellis’s
Glamorama) as a “terrorist pretext”, in the sense that Fight Club embod-
ies a typifiedAmerican terrorist imagery that would be, he argues, exploit-
ed by 9/11 terrorists in their recreation of terrorism as spectacle. To a cer-
tain extent, Petersen seems to suggest that a text such as Fight Club might
“literally” be a pretext, bearing some degree of “responsibility” in the light
of the tragic events that would follow. This responsibility would reside in
the rhetoric realm, the realm not only of imagination but of the use of
imagery, if this conflation of a moral/legal field with a rhetoric one can
ever make sense. This perspective interestingly echoes and reverses Pa-
lahniuk’s own. In the afterword to the UK edition of Fight Club, the author
raises and – maybe hastily – dismisses the issue of accountability in the
public sphere:
Once, a friend worried these stories might prompt people to copycat, and I insist-
ed that we were just blue-collar nobodies living in Oregon with public school edu-
cations. There was nothing we could imagine that a million people weren’t already
doing (Palahniuk, Afterword 215).14
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Extreme Measures: Addressing You
“It’s what you don’t know that matters most.”
(Victor Ward in Bret Easton Ellis’s Glamorama)
In the previous paragraph I have discussed Palahniuk’s novel as a
problematic reflection on community building, one that stretches the
boundaries and limits of how a speaking position can/should be in order
to assume authority in the public sphere, and what the consequences of
this assumption might be. Fight Club conjures up this reflection by means
of a strategy of depersonalization that can be seen as “totalitarian”. In this
paragraph, I shall elaborate on this and argue that the text also presents a
parallel streak of valorization of the individual, or address. In a sense, the
whole novel, with its structure of narrative personae, amounts to a struc-
ture of address, or interrogation. In terms of narrative voice, Fight Club
oscillates between first and second personhood. While the novel is osten-
sibly told in the first person by the nameless narrator, on several occasions
this voice performs an address through the second-person “you”.
On the one hand, the “you” expresses an estrangement of the narra-
tor from himself15 – justifiable, in diegetic terms, if one takes into account
the distance he experiences with relation to all events – especially in the
first part of the novel, due to his insomnia. On the other hand, if this is (as
repeatedly underlined) an expression of (pathological) alienation and
removal from human feelings, this distance is also a way to handle vul-
nerability. “You” emerges at the moment of trauma and unbearable pain.
The scene where Tyler pours lye on the narrator’s hand, painfully brand-
ing him for life, is in this sense emblematic. Second personhood inter-
venes, like a voice-over in guided meditation, creating a distance between
the conscience and the pain:
Guided meditation works for cancer, it can work for this.
“Look at your hand”, Tyler says.
Don’t look at your hand.
Don’t think of the word searing or flesh or tissue or charred.
Don’t hear yourself cry. (75)
While it expresses and simultaneously creates distance, the “you” is
the sign of a need for proximity, a call for an experience that vanquishes
alienation: “[d]on’t shut this out,” Tyler says, calling the narrator back to
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his painful experience exactly when he is attempting to master it by virtue
of removal (75). Especially in chapter two, the “you” also creates a bond
between the alienated (male) subject, his emotion, and his peers. The
“you” shadows and reproduces, in the narrative frame, the outreach of
empathy in a numb, dead world, the outreach the narrator seems to be after
in order to overcome the white-collar alienation that is to him a prefigura-
tion of death.
On the contrary, and reversing this logic of empathy, when the “you”
becomes completely “other”, it can be appropriated. “You” becomes
objectified in death and the possibility of empathy is foreclosed for good:
“the amazing miracle of death. One minute, you’re a person, the next
minute, you’re an object” (153). In a paradigmatically terrorist nightmare,
“you” is a potential target, and anyone might become a “homework
assignment” (187) for a member of Project Mayhem: “Tyler said the goal
of Project Mayhem had nothing to do with other people. Tyler didn’t care
if other people got hurt or not” (122).
As demonstrated by the previous examples, second personhood
works by simultaneously involving and distancing. The narrative “you”
creates bonds and unbinds. If, at the beginning of the novel, the narrator’s
recipe against alienation and vulnerability is a search for human empathy
through a sense of shared vulnerability, Tyler’s invention of fight club first
and Project Mayhem afterwards builds up an empathy that is based on a
sense of shared vulnerability turned against itself, until empathy in the
compassionate sense is no more, and a different form of empathy and
mutual protection emerges – one that I would refer to as answering a
“cult” logic, at the border between restricted circles and mainstream soci-
ety. “The goal was to teach each man in the project that he had the power
to control history. We, each of us, can take control of the world” (122; my
emphasis). How potentially expansive is that “we”?
This cult logic is mirrored by a specific form of passing on knowl-
edge – one that consists in how-to-instructions, “stuff [that] isn’t in any
history book” (13). While this kind of information – including, for
instance, instructions for preparing homemade explosives – is “not in the
history books”, it circulates in the “cult” societal formations that stretch
the borders of the political. The passing on of information in Fight Club is
a fundamental locus of confrontation and negotiation for the community.
The “you” who is the recipient of lists and instructions can be potentially
extended without limits – a possibility reflected in the Xeroxed copies of
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fight club rules made by the narrator. The novel’s style replicates this log-
ics of cult extension in several passages, not only through its do-it lists but
also through “philosophical” ready-made aphorisms, Tyler’s favorite
mode of enunciation, replicated by his followers: “[t]he mechanic starts
talking, and it’s pure Tyler Durden” (149).
In the central part of the novel, knowledge and discursive power are
more and more appropriated by Tyler. A sharp division is established
between Tyler, who “knows”, and those who have something we might
define “partial knowledge” and act regardless. Tyler asks for loyalty, and
his role is that of a vehicle of empowerment asking his disciples to act
responsibly on limited information: “the rule in Project Mayhem is you
have to trust Tyler” (130). As Project Mayhem gains momentum, its mem-
bers are asked to be fully responsible for a tiny extent of communal con-
struction, while simultaneously they must limit their scope of accounta-
bility, awareness, and responsibility to that small, unrelated extent:
You do the little job you’re trained to do.
Pull a lever.
Push a button.
You don’t understand any of it, and then you just die. (12)
They all know what to do. It’s part of Project Mayhem. No one guy understands
the whole plan, but each guy is trained to do one simple task perfectly. (130)
The confrontation that emerges in the last part of the novel between
the narrator and Tyler reflects a sociopolitical condition in which the trans-
mission/blockage or the dosage of narrative information is essential.
Tyler’s “political” appeal becomes more and more distanced and ironical-
ly framed as the narrator realizes that he is Tyler and attempts to master
him(self). Simultaneously, the narrator gradually rises to Tyler’s level of
awareness, to his knowledge: “I know this because Tyler knows this” (12,
26, 112, 185, 203). The confrontation between the two also appears to be
one around knowledge and its social uses. The personality split can be
seen as allegorizing a crisis of responsibility: while the narrator observes
that everybody do their little job without really understanding much of it
(12, 193), he simultaneously claims full responsibility for his actions: “the
world is going crazy …And I’m responsible for it all” (193). In my view,
the personality split portrayed in the novel allegorizes, to some extent, a
system that ascribes full accountability to the individual, while denying
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her/him access to full information, offering just “tiny”, “single serving”
(using the novel’s terms) information in the form of do-it lists.
Against the backdrop of vulnerability and generalized insecurity I
have discussed in the first paragraph, the simultaneous evocation, so to
speak, of the individual side of security handling can be ironic but is, in
this frame of individual address, highly significant. The perception of vul-
nerability, security, and insecurity is by nature subjective. As such, it stems
from the condition of not knowing enough, or, in some cases, knowing too
much. Vulnerability as the state of being in/secure is related to the han-
dling and dosage of information – determining what should be made pub-
lic and what should not, what should be concealed and what, on the con-
trary, should be shared. An ironic echo of this is to be found in the novel’s
description of a highly individualized form of safety – flight safety. The
narrator flies a lot for professional reasons, and on one of his flights he
observes an airline safety card:
Life insurance pays off triple if you die on a business trip. I prayed for wind shear
effect. I prayed for pelicans sucked into the turbines and loose bolts and ice on the
wings. […] I prayed for a crash. […]
I study the people on the laminated airline seat card. A woman floats in the ocean,
her brown air spread out behind her, her seat cushion clutched to her chest. The
eyes are wide open, but the woman doesn’t smile or frown. In another picture, peo-
ple calm as Hindu cows reach up from their seats toward oxygen masks sprung out
of the ceiling.
This must be an emergency.
Oh.
We’ve lost cabin pressure. (26)
The issue of vulnerability and the handling of security as paradoxi-
cally and significantly suspended between public and private emerge in
the narrator’s job. The narrator works as a “Recall Campaign Coordinator”
for a car company. His position consists in assessing the costs of court set-
tlements in case of incidents caused by defective vehicles versus the cost
of recalling defective vehicles:
I’ll be there to apply the formula. I’ll keep the secret intact. […]
A times B times C equals X. […]
If X is greater than the cost of a recall, we recall the cars and no one gets hurt.
If X is less than the cost of a recall, then we don’t recall.
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Everywhere I go, there’s the burned-up wadded-up shell of a car waiting for me. I
know where all the skeletons are. Consider this my job security. (30-31)
As it has been noted by several critics, this passage shows how
authentic human security is disregarded in favor of a calculated, covered,
cynical view of benefits versus losses for the sake of capital. In this con-
text, a widespread threat is provided by corporate capitalism as such, with
its imperative of compulsive commodity consumption. On the other hand,
I would like to emphasize that “keeping the secret intact” reduces securi-
ty handling to a private issue and silently involves the individual through
a disguised address to “you”. While not revealing full information for the
sake of profit, the narrator’s company indirectly invests (just like airlines
in printing laminated safety cards) individuals with direct, cynical respon-
sibility for handling risk.
It seems to me that the subject of in/security and vulnerability is
located somewhere between being protected by someone else and becom-
ing the active agent of one’s protection, and the reason for this is the fact
that in/security and vulnerability inevitably oscillate between individual
and communal dimensions. We have already seen that an interrogation of
the idea of security also interrogates the constituency of the political and
the nature of subjectivity. R.B.J. Walker notes that theorizations of securi-
ty (especially dominant ones) are often predicated on a “prior understand-
ing of what we mean by the political” (Walker 68). While discourses on
security have been enlarged to a global dimension, they are also, in my
opinion, increasingly “rooted in the subject” – increasingly articulated at
the level of the individual. This rooting in the subject is manifold. At one
level, it certainly bespeaks the increasing bio-political control16 on the
individual exercised in the name of national/global security, and engen-
ders all the preoccupations related to this increased control. On the other
hand, it also draws on the idea that security (and lack thereof) is a subjec-
tive, lived, experienced condition, and that to be secure means to be in the
condition to exercise one’s individual prerogatives with no hindrances or
anxieties – almost a matter of individual freedom. To paraphrase the nar-
rator of Fight Club, the skeletons stay buried, and the secret is kept intact.
Henry Giroux’s approach to Fight Club is relevant here. Giroux has
offered a powerful and highly influential critique of the film version of
Fight Club17. I find especially relevant how Giroux’s argument links indi-
vidualism and totalitarianism. He stresses choice in Fight Club – choice as
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individual, privatized, depoliticized – as the key to a “fake” rebellion
staged by the film. This rebellion is, according to Giroux, inauthentic,
exactly because it pertains to the realm of the individual, and is antidemo-
cratic in its core – mirror to a historical period, he maintains, that com-
bines a cult for the individual with a political apparatus that is increasing-
ly pervasive and repressive.
While Giroux has, in my view, a powerful insight here, I would fol-
low up with a question: must a foregrounding of individual free will and
choice inevitably be seen as the expression of a privatized, depoliticized
sense of self? Correspondingly, must, for instance, the representation of
violence and in/security in Fight Club be seen either as the cipher of a
pathological public sphere or as an expression of privatized individual-
ism? Or can the representation of violence and in/security in Palahniuk’s
novel, suspended as it is between private and public, individual and col-
lective dimensions, be of any consequence for a reflection on different
modes of subjectivization, and how they relate to the construction of col-
lectivities? Judith Butler’s reflection seems to point in this direction when
she observes that “one can even experience […] abhorrence, mourning,
anxiety, and fear, and have all of these emotional dispositions […] endeav-
or to produce another public culture and another public policy in which
suffering unexpected violence and loss and reactive aggression are not
accepted as the norm of political life” (Butler xiv). In Butler’s discourse,
not only anxiety and fear, hence a sense of vulnerability and a lack of secu-
rity, should become pretexts of critical political reflection, but the very
cycle connecting a breach of security, aggression, and the entitlement to
retaliate appears to be a political construction, not mere private violence
that is not worth discussing. To my mind, it is exactly this oscillation
between public and private discourses that appears to be significant18. To
a certain extent, Giroux’s discussion of Fight Club paradoxically stresses
this significance in linking individual choice to a political context – polit-
ical, that is, to the extent that it entails a re-articulation of individualism




BA Note, Notes, Anmerkungen, Notes
1 As a seminal reference study that tackles post-ColdWar developments of the
concept of security, see Rothschild. One initial question to keep in mind
when confronting the concept of security would be: due the centrality of
America within discourses that revolve around security as an issue of glob-
al scope, to what extent is the reinvention of global vulnerability and search
for global protection America-inflected?
This is not to say that America is the force behind all post-1980s discourses on
security: on the other hand, America is an increasingly globalized subject of
discourse and style of discourse, and in that sense the world is heavily
Americanized – and the discourse of security does not constitute an exception.
2 The novel was originally published in the U.S. in 1996. The edition I shall
quote from was published in the UK in 2006 with an afterword by the author.
From now on, references to this edition of the novel will be included paren-
thetically in the text.
3 See Lyotard.
4 Being held at gunpoint does not make the situation look as self-sacrifice for
the anonymous narrator, unless one keeps in mind that the narrator and Tyler
are actually the same person.
5 See Andreas and Price; Rothschild; Krause and Williams; Buzan and




9 Barker refers to Robin Wood, engaging her as follows: “Wood […] argues
that movies like Star Wars (Lucas, 1977) engaged with the fear of fascism
from inside – the anxiety that a capitalist democracy has more in common
with fascism and totalitarianism than can be acknowledged. While these
films establish anAmerican individualist ego as oppositional to a fascistic or
totalitarian system, their plot belies a fundamentally conservative adventure
narrative” (Barker 173).
10 This reflects an urge to locate the novel itself politically, in many respects
overlapping Tyler’s statements and the ideology behind the book. According
to this view, Tyler’s statements would reflect the author’s political stance.
11 The French Revolution is openly referred to in the novel (19-20).
12 Among these controversial works I would list Bret Easton Ellis’s novel
American Psycho and films such as Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing and
Oliver Stone’s Natural Born Killers.
13 See Ta.
14 Slavoj Žižek’s has performed a Lacanian reading of Fight Club across sev-
eral of his works (see Žižek 2002, 2003, and 2004), pointing its “extreme”
potential for a reflection on political change. Petersen refers to Žižek when
he points out the eerie, spectacular and déjà-vu quality of the 9/11 attacks (a
perception to which, in his view, Fight Club itself contributes) and how this
(paradoxically, in my view) pairs with a “passion for the real” (Žižek read-
ing Alain Badiou) that places authenticity in acts of violent transgression.
15 Second personhood may be seen as suggesting the presence of Tyler as a
veiled second narrator from the very beginning.
16 The concepts of “biopolitics” and “biopower” have their roots in Michel
Foucault’s work. They have become key concepts in the philosophical debate
of the late twentieth century, and have been appropriated and elaborated by
GiorgioAgamben, Michael Hardt, andAntonio Negri. My usage of the adjec-
tive “biopolitical” here points to the importance of discerning and assessing
individual life choices and habits in order to exercise sociopolitical control –
and articulate a convincing collective representation of security.
17 Commenting on the filmic version of the nameless narrator, named “Jack”,
Giroux writes that he is “no longer a producer of goods”. In Giroux’s read-
ing, the crisis of (white) masculinity in the 1990s is related, among else, to
the crisis of industrial culture. In other words, the emphasis on consumption
fosters increasing alienation from the process of production and from the
products themselves. See Giroux.
18 In this sense, former President George W. Bush’s “dead or alive” doctrine is
the public articulation of a “private justice” mentality, but it does not bear
less public value because of that.
In more recent times, the “private execution” of Osama Bin Laden on part of
U.S. military is a case that exemplifies many of the points I have been
attempting to make. The logics implemented have been those of “private jus-
tice”. Following Bin Laden’s elimination, President Barack Obama’s state-
ment “the world is a better place” resonates in my ear as a claim for a “col-
laborative”, globalized, open, public politics on security – a posteriori. This
political act has been performed by US military forces as a “lone ranger”
operation, and has been, with minimal time lag, articulated as allegedly
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